A AG is active in the procurement, holding, financing, operation, rental and leasing of aircraft. A AG is held by the company B. The owner of B is the C family.

In 2012, A AG acquired an aircraft and concluded an "Aircraft Management and Charter" agreement with D. In the agreement, A AG transferred the exclusive right to manage the aircraft and operate it vis-à-vis third parties to D.

All flights carried out with the aircraft were invoiced by the D. company. D retained a certain amount of the fees received as commission. D reimbursed the remaining amount to A AG as a rental payment. In detail, the agreement provided for the following:

• Flights by third parties ("charter"): A AG receives 85% less commission.
• Flights by related parties of A AG, executives of the C family, etc. ("key charter"): A AG receives 100% of the fees received by D less CHF 100 per flight hour.

The contract also stipulated that D had to obtain the prior consent of A AG for each charter flight. In addition, it would inform A AG of all flight enquiries from potential charter customers at A AG's request. A AG reserved the right to approve or reject any charter flight offered by D at its own discretion.

In 2012, the FTA confirmed A AG's input tax deduction with regard to import tax on the aircraft and domestic tax invoiced by D. The decision was based on a ruling request, which was based on the following utilisation forecast:

• 52 % Utilisation by third parties
• 28 % Use for the private use of related parties of A AG and
• 20 % utilisation for members of the C family

It later transpired that more than 50% of the actual use was for the private needs of A AG and related parties. As a result, the FTA denied the input tax deduction to the extent of the use for non-commercial purposes and qualified the structure in relation to the aircraft as abusive.

QUESTION OR PROBLEM

The main issue in dispute is whether input tax deduction is excluded if the aircraft is used for the private use of the beneficial owners (A AG and related parties).

DECISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT

9C_775/2023
In its earlier judgement (BGE 149 II 53), the Federal Supreme Court was guided by the practice of the FTA when determining the threshold above which private use of an aircraft is no longer considered part of a business activity. Accordingly, private use of up to 20 % is not harmful. If this value is exceeded, the entire private use of the aircraft by the beneficial owner and related parties falls outside the scope of VAT and does not entitle the beneficial owner to deduct input tax.

Both the lower court and the appellant are correct in assuming that A AG forms an entrepreneurial unit (in accordance with the principle of the unity of the company in BGE 142 II 488), which is also confirmed by the Federal Supreme Court in the present case. However, even if a business unit exists, input tax deduction is only possible to the extent of the business activity.

The appellant's activity raises the question of whether an input tax adjustment is necessary, even though the structure provides for the aircraft to be used exclusively for business purposes. The Federal Supreme Court answered in the affirmative, as the private use accounts for more than 20% of the total use and therefore does not fall within the scope of VAT. In this respect, in the court's opinion, there was never a right to claim input tax.

CONCLUSION

Aircraft holding structures are regularly the focus of VAT auditors. The judgement essentially confirms the practice of the FTA and its restrictive approach. The judgement goes beyond aircraft holding structures and taxable persons should always keep an eye on the proportion of "de facto" private use of these items in relevant constellations (e.g. holiday homes, vehicles, boats).

BACKGROUND

Electronic services follow the general rules for determining the place of supply for VAT purposes. This means that, as a rule, they are taxable where the recipient of the service is resident or domiciled ("recipient location principle"). What distinguishes electronic services from other services is primarily that they lead to a registration obligation for the foreign service provider if customers are domestic consumers (b2c). If a foreign supplier who is not VAT-registered in Switzerland provides a "normal" service to a domestic recipient and this service is subject to the recipient location principle, the domestic recipient is liable for acquisition tax if he is either liable for tax (b2b) or receives such services for more than CHF 10,000 per year (b2c). Due to this situation, the foreign supplier is not liable for VAT in Switzerland.

The situation is different if the foreign supplier provides a so-called electronic service. In this case, the foreign supplier remains liable for tax and must register in Switzerland for VAT purposes in order to settle the VAT with the FTA.

According to FTA practice, a service is deemed to be an electronic service if the following conditions are cumulatively met:

• It is provided via the Internet or another electronic network
• it is provided automatically and human involvement on the part of the service provider is minimal
• the provision of services is not possible without information technology.

In individual cases, questions of demarcation arise as to whether a service qualifies as an electronic service in a specific case. The Federal Supreme Court recently had to deal with such a demarcation question (judgement of 25 October 2024, 9C_482/2024). The main focus was on the question of "minimal human involvement on the part of the service provider". 

Facts of the case

9C_482/2024 BG
A is domiciled abroad and operates online sports betting. The FTA retroactively entered A in the VAT register and assessed an additional tax claim, as A provides electronic services to non-taxable persons in Switzerland, reaches the turnover limit and is therefore liable to pay tax. A disputed both the provision of electronic services and the tax liability.

DECISION 

The disputed question in this case was whether the service provided by A was automated and only performed with a minimum of human involvement.

The FTA and the Federal Administrative Court assumed that the disputed service consisted of the granting of a conditional opportunity to realise an agreed profit. The human influence in A's offer was limited to the determination of the betting odds and other preparatory acts aimed at the conclusion of future bets, but was not itself part of the service relevant for VAT purposes. A countered this by arguing that significant activities of the employees took place as part of the provision of the service: In the case of live betting, the betting odds had to be constantly processed manually. Customers also have access to a support team that they can contact if they have any questions or problems.

In its decision, the Federal Supreme Court referred to the essential core of the service relationship and followed the reasoning of the lower court. Although the human interventions claimed by A were of considerable importance, they were limited to the design of a product that was the subject of the offer (and not the service itself). According to the administrative practice of the FTA, human intervention in the context of preparation, development and maintenance work is not taken into account

In the context of the provision of the service itself, human intervention is always to be considered "minimal" if it does not serve to respond to individual customer requests. The court refers to the human croupier in an online casino or the lecturer in an online course who does not offer participants the opportunity to interact before, during or after the seminar. Although service and support are indispensable for A's offering, they are not an integral part of the actual electronic service. Rather, they are services that merely fulfil an assigned function. This distinguishes them from activities with more than minimal human involvement, such as counselling, evaluating, providing individual feedback or answering questions.

CONCLUSION

The judgement makes it clear that, from a Swiss perspective, services can be assessed as electronic services more quickly than some entrepreneurs may realise. The fact that a real person is involved before, during or after the provision of the service is sometimes of little help here. It should also be noted that electronic services in the b2c sector are also subject to special regulations in other (European) countries, which may make it necessary for Swiss companies to charge foreign VAT. Anyone who no longer makes their services available to foreign customers only by letter is therefore well advised to have their services qualified by a VAT expert. Failure to do so may result in considerable VAT risks.

BACKGROUND

Refresher: The taxable person operated an online platform via which customers could order food and have it delivered to them. Various restaurants offered their dishes on the platform. The platform took the view that it itself was the supplier of the meals (and did not merely mediate between customers and restaurants). Accordingly, it invoiced "its" services (delivery of the dishes including delivery service fees) to the customers at the reduced tax rate. The FTA, on the other hand, took the view that the platform was merely an intermediary between restaurants and customers. Accordingly, only the restaurants were allowed to invoice their services at the reduced rate. The services provided by the platform itself were to be taxed at the standard rate. The Federal Administrative Court (FAC) agreed with the taxpayer's view. It based its decision essentially on the presumed perception of the customers when using the platform (selection of meals, ordering, payment and delivery). However, the FAC did not consider the fact that, for example, the general terms and conditions (GTC) expressly identified the platform as an intermediary to be of such importance as to override the overall perception.

The Federal Administrative Court (FAC) agreed with the taxpayer's view. It based its decision essentially on the presumed perception of the customers when using the platform (selection of meals, ordering, payment and delivery). However, the FAC did not consider the fact that, for example, the general terms and conditions (GTC) expressly identified the platform as an intermediary to be of such importance as to override the overall perception.

JUDGEMENT OF THE FEDERAL COURT

From 8 August (9C_67/2024)

In its decision, the FSC focuses on objective criteria such as general terms and conditions and invoice documents when analysing the presumed customer perception. In particular, the platform had named the partner restaurants and these were known to the customers when using the platform and, from the FSC's point of view, it was always recognisable to the users that they obtained the food directly from the partner restaurants and not from the platform (through corresponding information during the ordering process and in the GTC). 

CONCLUSION

The judgement of the FSC should provide more legal certainty for taxpayers, as it gives greater weight to written documentation in the form of GTCs, for example. As an overall view of the circumstances in the specific case is decisive, the considered design of the external appearance remains of crucial importance.

Facts of the case

X AG holds a 9% stake in A AG. It has granted a loan to B AG. It requested confirmation from the FTA that its 9% shareholding in A AG and the loan to B AG are deemed to be qualifying holdings. X AG took the view that the provision in the second sentence of the legal definition was a "safe haven rule" in which the existence of a participation was automatically assumed. Below this threshold, the existence of a qualifying holding must be examined on a case-by-case basis. The FTA pointed out that shareholdings of less than 10 % of the capital are not deemed to be a qualified participation and that the granting of a loan does not constitute a participation in this sense either. X AG could therefore not claim an input tax deduction in this context.

DECISION OF THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

In the present case, the question was whether the complainant was entitled to deduct the input tax it had claimed. In order to be able to assess this, it was first necessary to examine whether the appellant is liable for VAT, i.e. whether it holds participations within the meaning of Art. 29 para. 3 of the VAT Act.

The Federal Administrative Court comes to the conclusion that the limit of 10% set out in Art. 29 para. 3 VAT is not an absolute value. The interpretation rather points to a "safe haven rule", according to which a participation of at least 10% is in any case considered a participation within the meaning of this article. For shares of less than 10%, however, the taxpayer can and must provide evidence that a qualified participation nevertheless exists, which in particular "conveys significant influence". The court does not conclusively comment on whether, even in the case of shareholdings of at least 10%, it is open to the tax authorities to prove that the shareholding is not held for business reasons but merely as a financial investment.

The question of how to successfully prove significant influence also remains unanswered. In the present case, the appellant was unable to provide proof of significant influence in the view of the court, which therefore rejected the appellant's view that it was entrepreneurial in this respect within the meaning of Art. 10 para. 1ter VAT Act.

The court also rejected the appellant's view that a loan could constitute a qualified participation. Shares in the capital of other companies are consistently understood as "participations". Receivables do not constitute participations.

CONCLUSION

It is positive that even in the case of shareholdings of less than 10%, the taxable person is free to prove that they have a qualifying holding within the meaning of Art. 10 para. 1ter MWSTG. It remains unclear how this proof can be provided. It should be viewed critically that the court leaves open whether the FTA reserves the right to negate a qualified participation even in the case of participations of more than 10%.

In the context of this judgement, it is also important to always bear in mind that VAT inspections must not tempt taxable persons to lull themselves into a false sense of security. A failure to raise an objection during a VAT inspection does not provide any protection of confidence that the same facts will not be objected to by the FTA in the future. The situation is similar with rulings, in which the FTA only ever comments on the facts of the case described and within the framework of the questions raised. Incomplete or incorrect facts do not give rise to any protection of legitimate expectations and the protection of legitimate expectations cannot go beyond the questioned treatment.

BACKGROUND

In the present dispute, the complainant acted as an asset manager. She received two types of compensation for her activities under an asset management agreement: On the one hand, she was paid the brokerage fees paid by the asset management clients plus brokerage fees from the bank; on the other hand, she received a monthly management fee. Under the brokerage agreements with two different banks, the complainant received remuneration or external asset management fees resulting from the activities recorded in the clients' accounts.

The question is how to qualify these fees for VAT purposes. Even if terms are listed and defined in black and white according to administrative practice, these terms (in this case charges) would have to be analysed precisely and placed in the correct context, otherwise the results would be completely different.

DECISION OF THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COURT 
A-5793/2022

In the present case, it is undisputed that the complainant acts as an asset manager and that the monthly management fee is subject to VAT at the standard rate. However, it is disputed whether the brokerage fees and external asset management fees are remuneration for a tax-exempt brokerage service or a taxable asset management service.

In case law and administrative practice, the view is held that the underlying transaction brokered is decisive for the categorisation of an intermediary activity. If the underlying transaction originates from the area exempt from tax, the remuneration for the brokerage is exempt from tax.

As an asset manager, the appellant offers both investment advice and execution for its clients and also receives separate and contractually agreed remuneration for these services. In the opinion of the complainant (based on point 6.1.6 of MBI 14 and on the previous case law of the Federal Supreme Court), brokerage fees (called: Courtagen) for execution are deemed to be exempt fees for trading in securities. Alternatively, the asset management service should be regarded as an exempt ancillary service to the brokerage service, as the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has already ruled in a similar case (C-453/05, 21 June 2007).

The complainant is of the opinion that it provides brokerage services in accordance with administrative practice. Non-application of this administrative practice would violate the constitutionally guaranteed protection of legitimate expectations.

Brokerage is clearly defined in section 5.10.1 of MBI 14 and refers to the activity of an intermediary acting in this capacity, which consists of working towards the conclusion of a contract in the area of money and capital transactions between two parties without being a party to the brokered contract and without having a vested interest in the content of the contract. Brokerage must be carried out as an independent intermediary activity. 

The FTA, on the other hand, considered the appellant's performance to be taxable asset management based on section 5.10.3 of MBI 14 and further believes that the financial contributions (retrocessions) represent a self-interest due to the obligation to deliver, which in turn would be contrary to exempt brokerage. 

The Federal Supreme Court is of the opinion that the complainant's execution service is to be regarded as ancillary to the main service of investment advice or asset management, as this service would not make sense on its own. It merely serves as an instrument for utilising the complainant's main service under optimal conditions. This type of service has no independent purpose for clients. If there were no asset management mandates, no client would utilise the execution services alone, but would commission a bank to do so.

Although the appellant is convinced that brokerage fees cannot be listed separately as an ancillary service in administrative practice, the Federal Supreme Court finds that the same service may have to be assessed differently depending on the context. In this case, the execution service (ancillary service) only fulfils a purpose in the context of an asset management mandate (main service).

With regard to the protection of legitimate expectations, the Federal Supreme Court points out that Chapter 6.1 of MBI 14 cited by the complainant under the heading "General banking services" refers specifically to services offered by banks. Therefore, the protection of legitimate expectations cannot be invoked in this context.

CONCLUSION

This judgement illustrates the relevance of a precise determination of the underlying service in the context of an intermediary activity. In this regard, it should be noted that even the explanations and terminology used in administrative practice are only valid in their respective context.